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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Korea has a social health insurance (SHI) system
with universal coverage of its population. In 1989,
universal coverage was completed through an in-
cremental extension of population coverage and
the extension of Medical Aid to low-income house-
holds. This occurred 12 years after the actual in-
troduction of SHI. The rapid expansion of SHI
and the achievement of universal coverage in a
short period are attributable to rapid economic
development, as well as to an authoritarian regime
seeking political legitimacy.1
A policy of low contributions and narrow ben-
efit packages with high co-payments has contin-
ued to ensure universal population coverage. Many
necessary healthcare services are not covered by
SHI, and Koreans often face high co-payment costs
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Background/Purpose: The coverage of social health insurance has remained limited, despite it being
compulsory in Korea. Accordingly, Koreans have come to rely upon supplementary private health insur-
ance (PHI) to cover their medical costs. We examined the effects of supplementary PHI on physician visits
in Korea.
Methods: This study used individual data from 11,043 respondents who participated in the Korean Labor
and Income Panel Survey in 2001. We conducted a single probit model to identify the relationship be-
tween PHI and physician visits, with adjustment for the following covariates: demographic characteristics,
socioeconomic status, health status, and health-related behavior. Finally, we performed a bivariate probit
model to examine the true effect of PHI on physician visits, with adjustment for the above covariates plus
unobservable covariates that might affect not only physician visit, but also the purchase of PHI.
Results: We found that about 38% of all respondents had one or more private health plans. Forty-five 
percent of all respondents visited one or more physicians, and 49% of those who were privately insured
had physician visits compared with 42% of the uninsured. The single probit model showed that those
with PHI were about 14 percentage points more likely to visit physicians than those who do not have PHI.
However, this distinction disappears in the bivariate probit model. This result might have been a conse-
quence of the nature of private health plans in Korea. Private insurance companies pay a fixed amount di-
rectly to their enrollees in case of illness/injury, and the individuals are responsible subsequently for
purchasing their own healthcare services.
Conclusion: This study demonstrated the potential of Korean PHI to address the problem of moral haz-
ard. These results serve as a reference for policy makers when considering how to finance healthcare ser-
vices, as well as to contain healthcare expenditure. [J Formos Med Assoc 2009;108(12):912–920]
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for healthcare services, including those that fall
under SHI. Healthcare providers have an incentive
to rapidly adopt new services and high-technology
procedures that are not covered by SHI, because
fees for such uncovered services are unregulated
and are therefore substantially higher. Conse-
quently, as of 2004, roughly 40% of healthcare pay-
ments in Korea were not covered by SHI and were
paid directly by patients.2
In this context, Koreans clearly have come to
rely upon supplementary private health insurance
(PHI) to cover their medical costs. Supplementary
PHI plans have been available since 1979, just 
2 years after the introduction of SHI in Korea. In
the 1980s and 1990s, the health plans became
increasingly popular because of narrower service
coverage of SHI in Korea. By 2000, the total cost
of premiums paid by the general public for PHI
had increased to approximately half that spent
on SHI.3
However, the Korean government did not take
into account the role of PHI in terms of health-
care financing. The view of the government on
the role of PHI is that it just supplements SHI and
is operated separately from SHI. PHI plans gen-
erally pay a fixed amount to their enrollees directly
to avoid the difficulty of networking with health-
care providers and reviewing claims.
Korean national health expenditure was 5.5%
of GDP in 2004, and its compound annual growth
rate was 11.5% over a 10-year period (1994–2004),
which was higher than that of the other 29 OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) countries (6.0%) over the same
period.4 In particular, the average number of phy-
sician visits in Korea increased steadily from 9.5
to 14.9 over the same period,5 which was higher
than that of 20 OECD countries (6.9) in 2004.4
In this sense, the growth of healthcare expendi-
ture and utilization in Korea might be in part
linked to an increase in PHI.6
Several papers have examined the effects of sup-
plementary PHI on expenditure or utilization of
health services in the Medigap Program that sup-
plements Medicare in the United States.7–9 Other
studies that have examined various healthcare
systems outside the United States have attempted
to clarify the effects of supplementary PHI on
healthcare utilization.10–12
The present study examined the effects of
supplementary PHI on physician visits among
Koreans. The supplementary PHI that we exam-
ined is a situation under which the health insur-
ers make a fixed benefit payment, but not one
that is proportional to the treatment costs incurred.
Ours is believed to be the first study to examine
the effects of fixed supplementary PHI on utiliza-
tion of healthcare services, using a representative
sample of the Korean population.
Methods
Database
This study is based on the Korean Labor and
Income Panel Survey (KLIPS), a longitudinal sur-
vey of a representative sample of Korean individ-
uals and their residential family units. The KLIPS
originated in 1998; in its first year, the sample size
was 5000 households, and it included 13,321 in-
dividuals aged 15 years or older. As a consequence
of low attrition rates and substantial efforts on
the part of the surveying authorities, in 2001, the
fourth KLIPS was conducted with almost exactly
the same cohort as had participated in the initial
survey. The 2001 sample size had declined slightly
to 4248 households and 11,043 individuals. The
KLIPS used a stratified multistage probability
sampling design for collecting samples from the
Korean population, and all responses were col-
lected using in-person interviews. The KLIPS pro-
vides a wide variety of information not only on
socioeconomic characteristics, such as income
sources and amounts, employment, and benefits,
but also on more general demographic characteris-
tics, such as age, sex, marital status, education, and
residency.
We used the individual data from 11,043
respondents who participated in the fourth KLIPS
in 2001. We supplemented these data with re-
sults from an additional survey on health and 
retirement that was conducted in the same year.
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This additional survey contained a variety of ques-
tions that pertained to the purchase of PHI, health-
care service utilization, health status, prevalence
of chronic diseases, and health-related lifestyle
issues. We performed a cross-sectional analysis
using the 2001 survey because the additional sur-
vey on health and retirement was administered
only in 2001.
Statistical analysis
This study used simple frequencies to describe the
characteristics of the study population. We used
a t test or a χ2 test to detect significant differences
between individuals with and without supplemen-
tary PHI, in terms of demographic characteristics,
socioeconomic status, health status, health-related
behavior, and medical service utilization.
A single probit model was developed to ex-
amine the determinants of purchasing PHI, with
adjustment for covariates as follows:
Y1* = b1’X + e1 (Y1 = 1 if Y1* > 0,
Y1 = 0 otherwise) (1)
Y1 in equation (1) was a binary dummy variable,
PHI purchase, which indicated whether or not an
individual held one or more private health plans.
X was a vector of factors that affected the proba-
bility of purchasing PHI: demographic character-
istics, socioeconomic status, health status, and
health-related behavior.
We also conducted another single probit model
to identify the relationship between PHI (Y1) and
physician visits (Y2), with adjustment for the co-
variates (X) used in equation (1) as follows:
Y2* = b2’X + a2Y1 + e2 (Y2 = 1 if Y2* > 0, 
Y2 = 0 otherwise) (2)
Y2 in equation (2) was a binary dummy variable
that denoted physician visits, which represented
whether or not an individual had visited one 
or more physicians during the preceding 12
months.
It is worth noting that various unobservable
covariates (e2), such as individual preference for
using healthcare services, or unmeasured individ-
ual health status, might have affected not only
physician visits (Y2), but also the purchase of
PHI (Y1). In other words, this assumption meant
that the unobservable covariates (e2) in equation
(2) may have been correlated with the unobserv-
able covariates (e1) in equation (1). Without con-
sidering the correlation (r) between the two error
terms (e1, ε2), estimating equation (2) could have
yielded biased and inconsistent coefficients for the
PHI purchase variable (Y1). For example, it might
be thought that the higher an individual’s prefer-
ence for using healthcare services, the greater the
probability of purchasing PHI. Therefore, not
controlling for this positive correlation between
the two error terms could have led to an overesti-
mation of the true effects of PHI on physician
visits. It is for this reason that we performed a bi-
variate probit model to examine the true effect of
PHI on physician visits, which simultaneously
estimated equations (1) and (2).
A bivariate probit model was necessary to posit
an identifying restriction that was included in
equation (1) but not in equation (2). The identify-
ing variable was assumed to influence the purchase
of PHI and to have little direct effect on physi-
cian visits. To identify a bivariate probit model,
this study excluded a variable (financial support)
from equation (2), which is offered by employ-
ers to help their employees purchase PHI. This
was because financial support is thought to have
a minimal effect on physician visits. This study
performed a likelihood ratio test to examine the
validity of the simultaneous equation model,
which showed whether the two error terms 
(e1, ε2) were independent. Equations (1) and (2)
were estimated using the full-information maxi-
mum likelihood.
Covariates
This study employed various covariates to con-
trol for demographic and socioeconomic status,
health status, and health-related lifestyle. Demo-
graphic factors used in this paper included age,
sex, marital status, education, and region for all re-
spondents surveyed. The region variable indicated
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whether a respondent lived in the Seoul metro-
politan area, a densely populated region that in-
cludes 47.2% of all Koreans, even though it
occupies only 11.8% of the total land area of
Korea.13 The number of beds per 1000 persons 
is 5.71 in metropolitan Seoul and 7.23 in other
areas.14 For socioeconomic factors, we employed
financial support and household income. Finan-
cial support represented whether or not respon-
dents received financial support from employers
for purchasing PHI. Household income was calcu-
lated by summing annual employment income,
asset income, pension, and other sources of 
income.
Comprehensive health variables were used to
control for health status or condition of the 
respondents. The questionnaire included self-
assessed health status as measured on a five-point
scale, as well as the prevalence of hypertension,
diabetes, and cancer. The latter disease variables
have not been assessed by other researchers in this
field. The three diseases were chosen because,
while cancer is a leading cause of death in Korea,
hypertension and diabetes also are leading chronic
diseases.15 Finally, we employed a health-related
lifestyle variable that took into account smoking,
drinking, and regular exercise. The smoking or
drinking variables represented whether or not
the respondent smoked or drank currently, while
the regular exercise variable referred to whether
or not the respondent spent half an hour or
more in moderate or vigorous physical activity at
least three times a week.
Results
Respondents’ basic characteristics
Table 1 shows the sample means of basic charac-
teristic variables used in this study. About 38% of
all respondents had one or more private health
plans as of 2001. Forty-five percent of all respon-
dents had visited one or more physicians during
the preceding 12 months, and 49% of the in-
sured respondents had physician visits compared
with 42% of the uninsured. The mean age of the
respondents was about 40 years. In terms of PHI
ownership, the mean age for the insured group
was 38 years, while it was 42 years for the unin-
sured group. Sixty-three percent of all respondents
were married, and > 81% of the insured were mar-
ried while compared with 52% of the uninsured.
About 66% of all respondents had at least a high
school education.
In terms of socioeconomic variables, the aver-
age annual household income was US$17,801,
while the annual household income (US$21,618)
of those insured was much higher than that of
uninsured individuals (US$15,446). Those who
received financial support for PHI from their 
employers represented 7.4% of all respondents
[insured (11.7%) vs. uninsured (4.7%)].
Fifty-eight percent of Koreans who participated
in this survey self-assessed their health status as
very good or excellent. The prevalence of chronic
disease among all the respondents was 3.6% for
hypertension, 2.5% for diabetes, and 0.4% for can-
cer. In terms of PHI ownership, those who pur-
chased it were healthier than those who did not.
With regard to risk behavior, 30% of all respon-
dents were current smokers, and 49% were current
drinkers.
Single probit model (1): the determinants 
of having PHI
The first column in Table 2 presents estimates from
a single probit equation (1) that examined fac-
tors linked to PHI purchasing activity. We found
that the probability of having PHI was highest
among individuals aged 35–44 years, and lowest
among respondents aged > 64 years. This study
found that PHI purchase probability was signifi-
cantly higher for women, those who were mar-
ried, and for the well-educated. Also, our results
showed that the probability of having a private
health plan increased with income. As expected,
individuals who received financial support from
their employer to assist with purchasing health
plans were more likely to have PHI than those
who did not receive such support. Table 2 also
shows that those who self-assessed their health
status as excellent were more likely to have PHI
Private health insurance and physician visit
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Table 1. Basic characteristics of respondents*
Total Privately insured Not privately insured p†
Total 11,007 (100.0) 4203 (38.2) 6804 (61.8)
Physician visit < 0.0001
Yes 4973 (45.2) 2086 (49.6) 2887 (42.4)
No 6034 (54.8) 2117 (50.4) 3917 (57.6)
Age (yr) 40.9 ± 16.8 38.9 ± 10.9 42.2 ± 19.4 0.0001
Age group < 0.0001
15–24 2097 (19.1) 352 (8.4) 1745 (25.6)
25–34 2308 (21.0) 1182 (28.1) 1126 (16.5)
35–44 2338 (21.3) 1426 (33.9) 912 (13.4)
45–54 1834 (16.6) 884 (21.0) 950 (14.0)
55–64 1270 (11.5) 314 (7.5) 956 (14.1)
≥ 65 1160 (10.5) 45 (1.1) 1115 (16.4)
Sex 0.0009
Male 5302 (48.2) 2109 (50.2) 3193 (46.9)
Female 5705 (51.8) 209 (49.8) 3611 (53.1)
Marital status < 0.0001
Single 4072 (37.0) 807 (19.2) 3265 (48.0)
Married 6935 (63.0) 3396 (80.8) 3539 (52.0)
Education < 0.0001
None 688 (6.3) 40 (1.0) 648 (9.5)
Primary school 1476 (13.4) 347 (8.3) 1129 (16.6)
Middle school 1518 (13.8) 566 (13.5) 952 (14.0)
High school 4234 (38.4) 1918 (45.5) 2316 (34.0)
College and university 3091 (28.1) 1332 (31.7) 1759 (25.9)
Region 0.0124
Seoul metropolitan area 5270 (47.9) 2076 (49.4) 3194 (46.9)
Others 5737 (52.1) 2127 (50.6) 3610 (53.1)
Household income (USD) 17,801.1 ± 16,788.3 21,618.1 ± 19,319.0 15,445.7 ± 14,518.3 < 0.0001
Financial support for PHI < 0.0001
Yes 813 (7.4) 493 (11.7) 320 (4.7)
No 10,194 (92.6) 3710 (88.3) 6484 (95.3)
Health status < 0.0001
Excellent 582 (5.4) 256 (6.1) 326 (4.8)
Very good 5792 (52.6) 2448 (58.3) 3344 (49.2)
Good 2503 (22.7) 982 (23.4) 1521 (22.1)
Fair 1751 (15.9) 469 (11.1) 1282 (18.8)
Poor 379 (3.4) 48 (1.1) 331 (4.9)
Hypertension < 0.0001
Yes 402 (3.6) 79 (1.9) 323 (4.7)
No 10,605 (96.4) 4124 (98.1) 6481 (95.3)
Diabetes < 0.0001
Yes 279 (2.5) 62 (1.5) 217 (3.2)
No 10,728 (97.5) 4141 (98.5) 6587 (96.8)
Continued
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than those who assessed their health status as
poor (reference group). Individuals who suffered
from chronic diseases such as hypertension or can-
cer were less likely to have PHI than their counter-
parts. Finally, those who exercised regularly were
more likely to have PHI than their counterparts.
Single probit model (2): effects of PHI on
physician visits
The second column in Table 2 shows estimates ob-
tained from a single probit equation (2), which
indicated that those with PHI were about 14 per-
centage points more likely to visit physicians than
those who did not have PHI. As regards demo-
graphic and socioeconomic factors, the number
of physician visits was significantly higher for
women than men, and this figure was higher
among married individuals than among the un-
married. Physician visits increased with age and
educational level. Those who had higher incomes
were more likely to visit physicians. The proba-
bility of visiting a physician was lower among in-
dividuals who received financial support from
their employer to assist with purchasing PHI than
among their counterparts, but the extent of the
probability was marginal. This suggested that fi-
nancial support was a valid identifying variable
that influenced purchase of PHI, and had little di-
rect effect on physician visits. As expected, those
individuals who self-assessed their health status
as excellent were less likely to visit physicians than
those who assessed their status as poor. Physician
visits increased with increasing prevalence of hy-
pertension, diabetes, and cancer. Those who exer-
cised regularly were more likely to visit physicians
than those who did not. Also, non-smokers were
more likely to visit a physician than smokers
were.
Bivariate probit model: effects of PHI on
physician visits
The last column in Table 2 contains estimates from
a bivariate probit model, which show that there
was no significant difference in physician visits
between those who had PHI and those who did
not. Table 2 shows that the coefficient of the cor-
relation (r) was significant, which meant that
the bivariate probit model was more appropriate
than the single probit model for estimating PHI.
Also, r was positive, which suggested that there
were unobservable and/or immeasurable factors
that increased the individual’s probability of hav-
ing PHI, as well as increasing his or her likeli-
hood of visiting a physician or vice versa. The results
for covariates were essentially the same across the
single and bivariate probit models; therefore,
this study only described the results of analyzing
the PHI variable in the bivariate model.
Table 1. Continued
Total Privately insured Not privately insured p†
Cancer < 0.0001
Yes 48 (0.4) 5 (0.1) 43 (0.6)
No 10,959 (99.6) 4198 (99.9) 6761 (99.4)
Smoking < 0.0001
Yes 3245 (29.5) 1425 (33.9) 1820 (26.7)
No 7762 (70.5) 2778 (66.1) 4984 (73.3)
Drinking < 0.0001
Yes 5340 (48.5) 2455 (58.4) 2885 (42.4)
No 5667 (51.5) 1748 (41.6) 3919 (57.6)
Regular exercise < 0.0001
Yes 1156 (10.5) 551 (13.1) 605 (8.9)
No 9851 (89.5) 3652 (86.9) 6199 (91.1)
*Data presented as n (%) or mean ± standard deviation; †t test or c2 test. USD = United States dollars; PHI = private health insurance.
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Discussion
This study examined the effects of PHI on physi-
cian visits among Koreans. In the single probit
model that treated the PHI variable as an ex-
ogenous independent variable, we found that,
consistent with previous results,8,9,12 those who had
PHI were more likely to use healthcare services
frequently than those without it. This suggests
that there was a difference in physician visits be-
tween the two groups, as long as we did not con-
trol for the correlation between PHI probability
Table 2. Results of single probit model and bivariate probit model*
Single probit model Bivariate probit model
PHI purchase Physician visit PHI purchase Physician visit
PHI (ref = non-PHI) 0.365 (0.030)§ −0.023 (0.221)
0.144|| 0.003||
Age group (yr; ref = 15–24)
25–34 0.626 (0.049)§ 0.143 (0.049)§ 0.631 (0.049)§ 0.227 (0.070)§
35–44 0.787 (0.057)§ 0.182 (0.056)§ 0.793 (0.057)§ 0.291 (0.084)§
45–54 0.586 (0.061)§ 0.208 (0.060)§ 0.592 (0.061)§ 0.284 (0.075)§
55–64 0.117 (0.069)† 0.397 (0.067)§ 0.124 (0.070)† 0.405 (0.067)§
≥ 65 −0.696 (0.096)§ 0.513 (0.075)§ −0.685 (0.096)§ 0.480 (0.077)§
Male (ref = female) −0.182 (0.037)§ −0.199 (0.036)§ −0.181 (0.037)§ −0.222 (0.037)§
Married (ref = single) 0.586 (0.039)‡ 0.158 (0.038)§ 0.582 (0.039)‡ 0.227 (0.053)§
Education (ref = none)
Primary school 0.121 (0.099) 0.153 (0.072)‡ 0.115 (0.099) 0.138 (0.073)†
Middle school 0.226 (0.101)‡ 0.149 (0.078)† 0.219 (0.101)‡ 0.147 (0.078)†
High school 0.481 (0.100)§ 0.163 (0.077)‡ 0.475 (0.100)§ 0.197 (0.079)‡
College and university 0.473 (0.102)§ 0.216 (0.080)§ 0.466 (0.102)§ 0.246 (0.081)§
Seoul metropolitan area (ref = others) −0.004 (0.027) −0.245 (0.026)§ −0.004 (0.027) −0.241 (0.026)§
Household income (log) 0.099 (0.010)§ 0.018 (0.009)‡ 0.099 (0.010)§ 0.029 (0.011)§
Financial support for PHI (ref = no) 0.353 (0.049)§ −0.085 (0.050)† 0.357 (0.049)§
Health status (ref = poor)
Excellent 0.467 (0.115)§ −1.185 (0.103)§ 0.481 (0.115)§ −1.132 (0.109)§
Very good 0.207 (0.101)‡ −1.305 (0.087)§ 0.223 (0.100)‡ −1.283 (0.089)§
Good 0.216 (0.101)‡ −0.821 (0.086)§ 0.230 (0.101)‡ −0.806 (0.087)§
Fair 0.225 (0.102)‡ 0.019 (0.088) 0.240 (0.102)‡ 0.024 (0.088)
Hypertension (ref = no) −0.160 (0.085)† 0.896 (0.099)§ −0.165 (0.085)† 0.870 (0.100)§
Diabetes (ref = no) −0.084 (0.101) 0.858 (0.127)§ −0.085 (0.101) 0.839 (0.127)§
Cancer (ref = no) −0.773 (0.275)§ 0.987 (0.302)§ −0.746 (0.272)§ 0.904 (0.301)§
Smoking (ref = no) 0.022 (0.040) −0.138 (0.039)§ 0.021 (0.040) −0.134 (0.039)§
Drinking (ref = no) 0.233 (0.032)§ 0.070 (0.031)‡ 0.232 (0.032)§ 0.097 (0.035)§
Regular exercise (ref = no) 0.264 (0.044)§ 0.330 (0.044)§ 0.262 (0.044)§ 0.358 (0.045)§
Constant −2.493 (0.151)§ 0.222 (0.123)† −2.504 (0.150)§ 0.151 (0.130)
r (e1, e2) 0.231 (0.130)†
Likelihood ratio test of r (e1, e2) = 0
χ2 2.851†
χ2 2837.86§ 2851.16§ 4354.73§
Pseudo R2 0.1939 0.1881
*Data presented as coefficient ± standard error; †p < 0.1; ‡p < 0.05; §p < 0.01; ||marginal effect. Ref = reference; PHI = private health insurance.
Private health insurance and physician visit
J Formos Med Assoc | 2009 • Vol 108 • No 12 919
and physician visits from unobserved and/or 
unmeasured covariates (the two error terms e1
and e2). However, after controlling for correla-
tion between error terms in equations (1) and
(2), we found no differences between the in-
sured and uninsured individuals with respect to
physician visits.
The net result is that there is no effect of PHI
on physician visits in Korea. This conclusion is
different from those in other studies that have
shown a positive effect of supplementary PHI 
on usage of health services.8,9,12 This might have
been because of the characteristics of Korean PHI,
which directly pays a fixed amount of money to
each subscriber who needs medical care. The
fixed payments vary according to the diseases
covered. Each individual is then responsible for
purchasing his or her own healthcare services.
The benefit criterion for the insured is not his or
her utilization of medical services that are cov-
ered by the health plans, but rather the incidence
of the covered diseases that enrollees acquire after
purchasing PHI. The price paid by subscribers 
for the healthcare services they use remains un-
changed, even though they are insured. Therefore,
the economic incentive for enrolling in the in-
surance scheme might not be clear to subscribers
in Korea. This results in addressing the possibil-
ity of moral hazard, which makes enrollees use
more healthcare services than they would if they
were they paying for the services themselves.
The current study used a single probit model
to examine the determinants of purchasing PHI.
We found that the propensity for purchasing PHI
was lowest among individuals aged > 64 years.
This probably resulted largely from the standard
policy of health insurance plans to reject new sub-
scribers if they are above a certain age. We found
that sex, marital status, income, and education
were factors for having PHI, which is similar to
the results of previous studies.9,16–21 Adverse se-
lection means that, all else being equal, people who
have a higher probability of requiring healthcare
services purchase more PHI than those who have
a lower probability. The present study found
mixed evidence of adverse selection in PHI. With
regard to demographic and socioeconomic fac-
tors, we showed evidence of adverse selection in
PHI, which indicated that those who were wealth-
ier, more educated or female were more likely to
visit physicians, as well as purchase PHI. However,
in terms of health status and condition (preva-
lence of hypertension and cancer, self-assessment
of health status), there was little evidence of ad-
verse selection, which showed that unhealthier
people who are more likely to use health services
are also less likely to purchase PHI. This may also
have resulted from the policy of PHI not to cover
chronic diseases that could have been acquired
before purchasing PHI.
This study suggests that the Korean PHI sys-
tem is similar to Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs)
that have been implemented in Singapore, the
United States, and China. The money in MSAs
belongs to the account holder, but its purpose is
limited to pay for healthcare services.22 This is
true in the sense that an individual is responsible
for the extent to which he or she uses healthcare
services. However, the two systems are different
in that the Korean PHI framework pools the risk
among all subscribers, while MSAs are individual
savings accounts that can only be used for health-
care expenses and have no risk-pooling system
among the account holders. MSAs have received
attention as alternatives to traditional health in-
surance schemes because of their potential to ad-
dress the problem of moral hazard caused by
insured individuals who use more services than
are needed.22–24 However, to date, there is limited
evidence of MSAs reducing healthcare service uti-
lization or limiting healthcare expenditure.22,25,26
Hence, the results of our study, which demon-
strated the potential of the Korean PHI to address
the problem of moral hazard, serve as a reference
for policy makers when considering how to fi-
nance healthcare services and to contain health-
care expenditure.
Although there has been pressure from the
general public to improve SHI benefits, coverage
has remained limited because of financial con-
cerns and because it would be politically inadvis-
able for the Korean government to increase SHI
S. Kang, et al
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premiums. Under such circumstances, the Korean
government needs to consider supplementary
PHI as an alternative to SHI.
One of the disadvantages of employing a flat
payment in Korean PHI is that benefits paid may
be less than costs incurred. Also, Korean PHI cov-
ers a limited number of diseases and therefore,
many enrollees have purchased two or more pri-
vate health plans.27 The reimbursement scheme
implemented by Korean PHI providers recently
has started to change from a fixed benefit system
to one that delivers benefits proportional to costs
incurred for all diseases. This might negate the
advantage of fixed PHI that addresses the problem
of moral hazard. It would be of interest to inves-
tigate the effect of introducing cost-proportional
PHI on healthcare utilization in Korea.
In conclusion, this study could act as a fore-
runner for investigating the effect of PHI on
health care utilization in Korea, and could have
useful policy implications for other countries in
a similar situation.
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